Th roughout the Islamic world those claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad (T. seyyid/şerif, pl. sadat/eşraf ) were (and are) accorded a special status. Th is article shows that the process of teseyyüd ("seyyidization") not only took place through offi cial awards, but also through appropriation. In the Ottoman Empire registers thus began to be kept of offi cially recognized sadat. Th e examination of these, largely un(der)studied, sources argues that the state sometimes employed its capacity to seyyidize for (cultural) political purposes. Th e article also sheds valuable light on Ottoman policies vis-à-vis tribalism and nomadism.
Th roughout Islamic history, descendants of the Prophet Muḥ ammad (T. seyyid/şerif, pl. sadat/eşraf ) 3 have been venerated, and they enjoyed a variety of privileges in all parts of the Islamic world. Th erefore, belonging to 'the People of the House' (Ahl al-Bayt) invariably conferred prestige and often wealth. Furthermore, sadat's power tended to extend to whoever honored them and championed their well-being. In some historical settings, however, the House of Muhammad assumed additional signifi cance so that a great many people, commoners and rulers alike, claimed to have descended from it. Rulers' claims were linked with state-making and political competition while civilian claims too could be linked with political processes in a variety of ways. For example, the proselytizing dervishes in medieval India whose fi ctive descendants came to constitute a virtual caste claiming Muhammadan nobility did not have a political project per se, but the confessional and social space they colonized eventually served several state-builders in the region. 4 In late medieval Anatolia and the Balkans, something similar happened. Early claimants of the title were sufi mystics who were instrumental in conquering the lands where the Ottoman state was to emerge. 5 An important diff erence was that seyyidship in Ottoman territories never became entrenched in as rigid a social hierarchy as in India. Yet, Ottoman territories, too, saw fi ctive claims of Muhammadan nobility as early as the sixteenth century and in increasing numbers thereafter. Th ousands of Ottoman subjects claimed descent from the Prophet's House, some buying or stealing certifi cates, others bribing offi cials, or forging genealogies.
Th e Ottomans called false claims of Muhammadan nobility teseyyüd', literally meaning 'to feign nobility' or self-ennoblement. According to the ruling elite's own account of the matter, teseyyüd was a unilateral phenomenon, a transgression by ordinary people. Transgression though it indeed was, of the purity of the noble line to say the least, the state indirectly contributed to teseyyüd by provoking a defensive refl ex among its subjects against religious, fi scal and administrative consolidation. Furthermore, it can be argued that teseyyüd emerged as a strategy of defense and resistance because, paradoxically, the state offi cially granted certain privileges and 3) I use modern Turkish spelling for Ottoman-Turkish terms and names according to the New Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary (Istanbul, 1968) , and transcribe quotes according to the IJMES system. 4) Roy 1983 : 58-70; Wright 1999: 649-59. 5) Kılıç 2000 Kılıç , 2005 immunities to sadat. Secondly, it is also possible that the state manipulated the title for purposes of patronage when political exigency so required, as in a distinct way, in the sixteenth century. Th e Ottoman term 'teseyyüd' falls short of capturing these multiple dynamics behind the claims of seyyidship; hence my proposal to coin the new term 'seyyidization', which invokes the double sense of self-ennoblement and ennoblement by the state. Th is dual sense applies to sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Anatolia and the Balkans more than any other part of the empire or other period because judging by the Registers of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf, 6 it was during these two centuries that the Ottoman state aspired to maintain direct control over the sadat in these two zones, if partially. While claims of seyyidship were not limited to any particular social, ethnic or religious group, as studies on later periods indicate, the study of these registers suggests a strong link in this zone between Ottoman policies and seyyidization on the one hand, and tribalism and the Alid challenge on the other.
Th e Source
Th is study is based on Registers of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf, an underutilized, important source for studying sadat of the Ottoman realm. 7 Yet, they are limited in a number of ways partly refl ecting the limits of Ottoman territorial control. First, Nakibüleşraf registers off er no vision of local confl icts and power struggles that propelled seyyidization in diff erent regions and periods. 8 Secondly and more importantly, although they off er an all around view from the cihannüma 9 of Istanbul, where the imperial marshal stood, that view does not extend very far, normally, not further than the core lands of the empire, i.e. the eastern Balkans and Anatolia, largely excluding the area to the east of Sivas and Adana. Th erefore, Kurdish sadat 6) Nakibüleşraf Defterleri (Registers of the Marshal of the Descendants of the Prophet): henceforth ND. For information on the collection, see below and Appendix I. 7) To my knowledge, only Rüya Kılıç has used the Nakibüleşraf Registers so far. 8) Th e registers can be useful for local studies too but they have to be treated with caution. For example, incorrect binding can shuffl e records from diff erent places, or leave some lists incomplete. Th erefore, they have to be supplemented with other sources. For an example of shuffl ed records, ND # 30/28b; 31b-32a (Ayntab and an unidentifi ed town); and an incomplete record, ND # 25, which lists only seven sadat in Ayntab in 1695 while the town's court registers tell us that only two years later, the number of offi cially recognized sadat in the town was 352 (Court Register # 48A/167-61, 1697). 9) Rooftop belvedere.
are largely left uncovered. 10 By the same token, we do not encounter Arab sadat in the Registers of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf either. Th us, it would appear, aff airs of the sadat in Eastern Anatolia as well as the Arab provinces were managed locally, if by appointees of the capital in some important provincial centers. Deputies (kaymakam) of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf in the provinces kept track of the sadat in their region without having to get approval from the capital.
11 Th is diversity in the degree of central intervention conformed to the general pattern of Ottoman administrative practices. It was further reinforced by the fact that the Arab provinces had longer and well-established traditions of managing the Muhammadan pedigree. Furthermore, places of historical signifi cance such as Mecca, Karbala, Najaf and Baghdad certifi ed genealogies also for claimants from Anatolia, 12 and this signifi ed not a division of labor but competition with Istanbul for the authority to designate Muhammadan nobility. Th is study focuses on the area over which Istanbul claimed and exercised direct authority.
Th e Registers of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf are limited in their chronological scope as well. Th ey start with records of the fi rst Nakibüleşraf Mahmud Efendi (1495 Efendi ( /96-1536 , and last until the end of the empire, but with a major gap extending roughly from 1695 to 1874. In other words, they leave out a very important and lively period in the history of seyyidization in the Ottoman realm. Th anks to pioneering studies by Bodman, Rafeq, Batatu, and later, Ph. Khoury, Schatkowski Schilcher and Winter, 13 we know that the popular demand for the title peaked in some of the Arab provinces in the eighteenth century, and remained high at least part of the nineteenth century. Such may have been the case in Anatolia as well.
14 As for the records from 1874-1923, they tell more about Ottoman administrative reforms than sadat of the realm or seyyidization. In any case, the way the Ottoman state tackled the question of (religious) nobility in this period is related to its new visions of citizenship, Islamic modernity and Sunni orthodoxy, and these topics fall in an area of expertise I am hardly 10) See Gezik 2004: 147-76. 11) Winter 1992: 186, 193-96; Ze'evi 1996: 73-74; Salati 1992: 27; Bodman 1963: 99. 12 ) ND #19/4a ; Birdoğan 1995: 140; and Karakaya-Stump 2008: 165-66 on the continued autonomy of the notable seyyid families in Najaf and Karbala. 13) Bodman 1963; Schatkowski Schilcher 1985; Rafeq 1968; Masters 1991: 151-58; M. Winter 1985: 17-41. 14) Eighteenth-century court records from various towns reveal a high number of urban residents who bore the title. qualifi ed to write about. Th erefore, what follows will be limited to the registers dealing with the period 1495-1695.
I. Seyyidization: An Attempt at Periodization
Th e Registers of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf reveal four distinct periods in policies adopted by the imperial center towards sadat of the realm: these are, roughly, 1495-1658, 1658-1695, 1695-1874 and 1874-1923 . Each period was marked by a diff erent style of control and intensity of certifi cation as refl ected in the number of people offi cially recognized in Istanbul as descendants of the Prophet and those identifi ed as impostors. As for the people's side of the story, i.e. vicissitudes of the actual claims of Muhammadan nobility, these can be followed in the Registers only indirectly and with an uncertain degree of accuracy because the degree of overlap between claims and certifi cation is not clear.
1500-1658
Judging by the extant Registers of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf, consistent eff orts to identify, certify and register the sadat of the Ottoman realm started early in the sixteenth century. Th ese eff orts paralleled the spread of other kinds of surveys and regular registers that served to control resource and status allocation.
Complaints about seyyidization started not long after. One fi nds an intimation of a tension regarding false claims in a quatrain interjected in a fatwa attributed to şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi (1545-74 One also fi nds reference to false claims in early registers of the 'Important Aff airs' (mühimme) from the middle of the sixteenth century. 16 Orders 15) Rossi 1954: 13. 16 ) Lütfi Paşa's Asafname (1539-41) also reveals an awareness of the phenomenon and recommends that usurpers be eliminated according to "old registers". However, the relevant passage here is probably a later addition because the oldest known copy of the Asafname (1606) does not have this paragraph. Furthermore, it is unlikely that there were any against false sadat appear to have become more frequent in the 1570s, revealing, already back then, a sense of concern on the part of the imperial center. 17 Th ey spoke of impostors who relied on forged certifi cates and "favoritism of the grandees," and several of them depicted the impostors as evildoers (ehl-i fesad ) or rebels. As the number of impostors began to trouble the state, ironically, the number of sadat certifi ed by the Imperial Nakibüleşraf also increased. (Figure 1 ; Appendix I)
Between the early decades of the sixteenth century and the 1570s, the number of sadat who were annually 'ennobled' by the Imperial Nakibüleşraf rose from 15 to 22, a modest number that can be attributed to the gradual establishment of the offi ce.
18 But in 1576-1584, the number of people certifi ed annually was about 80. Th e next upsurge was during Allâme Mehmed Efendi's tenure (1629 Efendi's tenure ( /30-1634 19 people were certifi ed annually. Th is was precisely when Aziz Efendi, an imperial bureaucrat, vehemently complained about the extent and consequences of seyyidization, and gave an estimate of 300.000 for the false sadat of the realm. Subsequently, the certifi cation activity of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf subsided for more than a decade, only to be followed by another upsurge in the fateful year of 1648. Th e number of certifi ed sadat rose from 5-30 a year to 176 (or 194) . 20 It is possible that this sharp rise was linked to the regular process of title renewal eff ected upon the accession of sultan Mehmed IV. Of all the episodes of intensive certifi cation, this appears to be the only one that can be associated with the accession of a sultan.
"old registers" during Lütfi Paşa's time. Akgündüz 1990-96: 6: 257, 275 Yüksel and Köksal 1998: 7; Refi k 1932 Refi k : 30-31, orders dated 1571 Refi k , 1572 ND # 1 (1495 ND # 1 ( -1539 ND # 1 ( ) and # 2 (1536 ND # 1 ( -1572 . ND # 2 is not dated but labelled after the second nakibüleşraf Muhterem Efendi (943-980/1536 Efendi (943-980/ -1572 . Annual averages are obtained by dividing the total number of names authenticated by a given nakibüleşraf by the length of his tenure. For details, see Appendix II. 19 ) Th e fi rst fi gure is taken from summary (icmal) records, the latter is from hüccet records. 20) Th e fi rst fi gure is taken from icmal records, the latter is from hüccet records.
1658-1695
Th e second half of the seventeenth century was marked by a peak in imperial surveillance over the sadat. Record-keeping became more rigorous and fi ve general inspections were held starting in 1658. Inspection of the sadat was not a new idea. Like Lütfi Paşa a century earlier, Aziz Efendi too had recommended in the 1630s that a survey be held in order to distinguish the true sadat from impostors, 21 but the administration did not act upon Among the subsequent inspections, only Osman Efendi's can be dated with certainty. Th is was the largest inspection ever held, covering 12,000 people in Anatolia and the Balkans. It was probably no coincidence that it overlapped with the Ottoman-Habsburg War (1683-1699), one of the most exacting wars in Ottoman history. During the war, the state carried out several inspections either to identify the military manpower at its disposal or the taxable population, and both tasks required distinguishing the askeri from the reaya, a formidable endeavor in view of the permeability the Ottoman estates had acquired since the sixteenth century. Th us, the fi scal emergency was intertwined with the task of restituting the social and political order, and vigilance against sadat was linked with this dual task. It is highly likely that the other two inspections were also undertaken during the Ottoman-Habsburg war.
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Th e outcome of the inspections varied. In some locales, all claimants were able to retain their title, as in Özi in the western-most zone subject to central supervision. Here, sadat in districts with a very large seyyid population kept their title. In some locales, a few lost their turban, and in others, a great many. For example, in Aleppo, 300 out of 596, in Ereğli-Karaman, 298 out of 541 claimants were demoted. were the least successful in their claims of title: 1,045 out of 1,260 claimants lost their turban. 26 (Table 1 ) Th is period also saw a dramatic decline in regular certifi cation. (Figure 1 ; Appendix II) Consequently, the number of certifi ed sadat stabilized in most places. Yet, it continued to rise, for example, in Dimetoka (from 651 to 989), in Konya (from 253 to 647), in Ayntab (from 148 to 352), and Hacıoğlu Pazarı (from 106 to 275) in the course of the four decades after the fi rst inspection of 1658. 27 Why inspections discouraged new claims in some districts and not others needs to be studied separately.
1695-1874
Osman Efendi's inspection of 1695 was the last to be recorded in the Registers of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf, and possibly, the last to be undertaken by the imperial center. Regular certifi cation activity too nearly came to a complete halt in the eighteenth century. Th ere are very few records from this period and they are dispersed randomly in the seventeenth-century registers. 28 As noted earlier, however, we know that seyyidization continued in the eighteenth century in several parts of the Empire. 29 For example in Silistre, the number of sadat rose almost three fold from 1698 to 1715. Next to Silistre, Alakilise and Eski Cuma in Nigboli also experienced a rise, if on a modest scale. In Alakilise, 31% of the households (11.6% in villages) and in the town of Eski Cuma 10.7% (20% in villages) were counted as descendants of the Prophet in 1752. 30 Th ese fi gures suggest a level of seyyidization comparable to Damascus, where the number of sadat is estimated to have increased from 14.3 to 22.5% of the urban population in the fi rst half of the eighteenth century. 31 Evidence from south-eastern Anatolia, particularly the city of Ayntab, indicates that by the end of the century, almost all urban grandees were seyyid and sadat in general played a major role in regional politics all the way from Maraş to Aleppo.
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Th e Imperial Nakibüleşraf continued to dispatch warnings to the provinces instructing deputy nakibüleşrafs to prevent usurpation of the title, but judging by the collection of Nakibüleşraf Registers, he was no longer involved in the proof and certifi cation process. Th e delegation of the deputy nakibüleşrafs, who were often drawn from among the local elite, resonated the relocation of authority in the provinces in general, characteristic of the eighteenth century. It is, of course, possible that the former system of certifi cation through the Imperial Nakibüleşraf was substituted by an alternative mechanism of central control, that is, apart from the registration of sadat receiving stipends from the central treasury, which continued. Such a mechanism as there may have emerged is yet to be discovered.
At the same time, this shift in the locus of authority to designate sadat may have been less signifi cant than it appears because even when the imperial center was involved in the certifi cation process, even in the central lands of the empire, proving descent may have been fundamentally a local matter. Witnesses and communal recognition, including hearsay, had always been very important in the process of proof and they continued to be. 33 An interesting court case from Mardin, running on 1761-62, indicates that claimants could prove descent by witness testimony alone, and 30) Şimşirgil 2002: 239, 249, 252. 31) Establet and Pascual 1994: 128; Parveva 1998: 166 . It should be noted that Parveva's fi gures are based on tax records and diverge greatly from those found in the Nakibüleşraf Registers of the same period. I am grateful to Rossitsa Gradeva for translating this text into English for me. 32) Canbakal 2006 Canbakal , 2009 Bodman 1963; Raymond 1989. 33) Bottini 1999: 351-73; Kılıç 2000: 141; Düzdağ 1983: 82; Haykel 2002: 194-225 . Also ND # 27, 2a; # 28, 10b. For technical aspects of the process of certifi cation and role of the local authorities in the process, see Canbakal 2006. thereby challenge and overrule the authority of the deputy nakibüleşraf as well. 34 
1874-1923
As noted earlier the last six registers in the collection of Nakibüleşraf Registers do not really tell us about seyyidization, bottom-up or top-down. Nor do they say anything about how many people were currently certifi ed in diff erent parts of the empire, except for those sadat in Istanbul who received stipends from the imperial treasury in 1901-1906, 500 people in all.
35 Th e registers clearly indicate, however, that the imperial center was determined, like never before, to oversee the overseers. Appointments to the offi ce of deputy nakibüleşraf at district (kaza) level were made centrally and recorded. Eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, Mecca, Medina, and the Yemen were now brought under imperial supervision. Historical strongholds of an Alid aristocracy and loci of authority over Alid pedigree, Karbala, Najaf and Kazimiya, too, were now given Ottoman nakibüleşrafs.
36 Th e extant registers trace the appointments from 1874 to 1903/1904, 37 and the payrolls, until 1912. 38 Ordeals of the following wars, probably bolstered by priorities of the Union and Progress rule, spelled the end of all systematic attempts of control. Sporadic correspondence between the Imperial Nakibüleşraf and his deputies in the provinces continued until 1923.
II. Seyyidization: An Attempt at Localization
Th e earliest Nakibüleşraf Register that can be used for purposes of localization dates from 1576, when residential information began to be recorded with some consistency. Th erefore, this section focuses on the period 1576-1695, for which we have fairly reliable information about the places of residence or origins of the sadat. Settlements with very high rates of seyyidization were located in four provinces: Karaman, Özi, Anadolu and Sivas. According to registers from 1576-1634, seyyidization by imperial sanction was at its highest in Karaman, Özi and Anadolu: 70-80% of the certifi ed sadat lived in these three provinces. 39 In Karaman, the sub-provinces (sancak) of Konya (especially Ereğli) and Niğde, and the district of Karaman, in Anadolu, the sub-provinces of Hamid and İçil, and the district of Bursa, and in Özi, the sub-province of Silistre (especially Şumnu and Umurfakih) and Nigboli (especially Alakilise, Herazgrad, Ruscuk) were particularly prominent. Th e following locations were also of some signifi cance in terms of seyyidization: Saruhan, Menteşe and Aydın in Anadolu, Edirne (especially Dimetoka) in Rumeli, Varna in Silistre, and the district of Giresun in Trabzon. (Maps 1-3 Later records from the second half of the seventeenth century highlight yet another province as heavily seyyidized: the province of Sivas. As noted above, sadat of Sivas were the least successful in proving their noble pedigree in the inspections. During this period, the districts of Aydos, Herazgrad, Ruscuk and Silistre in Özi, Ereğli and Konya in Karaman, the sub-provinces of Sivas, Tokat and Amasya in Sivas, each had more than 500 sadat. Outside this zone, the district of Dimetoka in Edirne/Rumeli, Manisa in Saruhan/Anadolu, and Aleppo also had more than 500 sadat each. Th e following also had considerable seyyid presence: Bursa, Ankara, 
Whose territory?
Th ese areas had at least two salient features in common: unorthodoxy and preponderance of tribes. Th e areas in Anatolia where Shah Ismail's early supporters came from, namely, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, Teke (Antalya), Menteşe (Muğla), Hamideli, Maraş, Elbistan, Yozgat, and Aleppo were precisely those that scored highest in inspections. Th ose who played a secondary role as Ismail's supporters were the Çepnis of Canik, Giresun and Trabzon region and Varsaks of İçil and Adana. 48 In available studies on Anatolian Kızılbaş, the Province of Sivas (Rum) clearly stands out with a large population concentration, seconded by the provinces of Karaman, Zulkadriye, Erzurum, Aleppo, eastern parts of the Province of Anadolu, Antalya, İçil, and Çukurova. 49 Findings regarding the distribution of Anatolian Alevis today largely overlap with this picture notwithstanding further migration in the seventeenth century and after. 50 Likewise in Ottoman Europe, the strip of land from Babadağ in modern Romania, down to Dimetoka in Greece, with much of eastern Bulgaria in between (Silistre, Dobruca) is still the land of Kızılbaş. It was within this zone that three of the most revered sanctuaries of the Alids of the eastern Balkans stood: Otman Baba in Hasköy, Kızıl Deli in Dimetoka and Demir Baba near Herazgrad. Hasköy, Silistre, Herazgrad, were populated at the beginning of the sixteenth century by exiles from Yozgat, Konya, Sivas, which had a strong Alid tradition, but Deli Orman already had an older heterodox tradition going back to early Ottoman expansion, or even before.
51
Th ere was also a signifi cant overlap between areas with a high Kızılbaş population and tribal territory although the two were not congruent. Th e area between Sivas and Maraş was occupied by Yeni-İl and Zulkadriye confederations, and the area from Maraş all the way down to the Syrian desert was occupied by the Turcomans of Damascus and Aleppo. Th e Province of Zulkadriye, like Aleppo to the south, had a remarkably high rate of nomadic population during the last two decades of the sixteenth century: 54% and 58% respectively.
52 Th e westward migration of the tribes of eastern Anatolia from the mid-seventeenth century onwards implanted a belt of tribesmen from Sivas to Afyon in western Anatolia, with offshoots to Marmara (Balıkesir) and the Aegean coast. 53 Around the same time, Baraks of the Province of Sivas migrated to the Province of Raqqa, where a group of them settled; their descendants are said to be Alevi today. Subsequently, some migrated to İzmir and some to Iran.
54 Th e Province of Sivas was the land of the Boz Ok. Taurus region was occupied by Uç Oklu and Ramazanlı, while Karaman plain between Cilicia and Konya was the habitat of the At Çeken. 55 In Ottoman Europe, too, every single locality that had a signifi cant seyyid presence lay within the Yörük zone.
III. An Attempt at Interpretation

a. Cultural Politics of Seyyidship
Descent from the house of the Prophet was of crucial ideological significance for pro-Safavid groups. In addition to the shah himself, 56 dedes, religious heads of the Alid communities (ocaks) in Anatolia, claimed to be seyyid, and they continue to do so even though their claim has been put to test by modernity among their followers in recent decades. 57 According to Ocak, the dedes' claim of seyyidship did not go any further back in time than the Safavids' own claim of noble descent. It was Ismail himself who instituted the post of baba/dede as a religious and tribal leader and attributed seyyidship to each, thus tying these leaders to his own person. 58 Th us, direct confrontation with the Safavids imposed on the Ottoman center the task of challenging and undoing these ties while the contested domain of Iraq too had an elite with Alid loyalties to be cajoled. 59 Yet, the competition between the two royal houses over the loyalty of the Kızılbaş was not about mundane politics alone. Millenarianism in sixteenth-century Anatolia was not limited to the Kızılbaş milieu, nor was love of Caliph Ali. As 53) Sümer 1972: 208-211 Subrahmanyam points out, expectation of a world redeemer/conqueror from the House of Muhammad/Ali had transregional currency from South East Asia to Morocco, and diverse elements of this disposition were shared by Sunnis, commoners and rulers alike. 60 Against the backdrop of interstate competition, rulers were both driven by and capitalized on this heightened receptivity to things Muhammadan.
Ottomans were not immune to the zeitgeist. Th e care they took for the upkeep of the two holiest places for the Alids, the tombs of Caliph Ali and his son Husayn in Karbala and Najaf may pale in the face of what they did for Mecca and Medina, but care they did take.
61 Th e offi ce of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf was set up under Bayezid II and assumed the task of appointing provincial marshals (nakibüleşraf kaymakamı), authenticating claims of Muhammadan pedigree and protecting interests of the sadat. Th us, the emergence of regular registers for sadat of Anatolia and the Balkans in the 1530s probably signifi ed more than bureaucratization alone. Tax exemptions enjoyed by individual sadat may also have turned into blanket rules around the same time while large amounts of stipends were dispensed from the central treasury to prominent sadat of the realm. 62 While millennialism later faded away, championship of the Prophet's lineage continued to occupy a crucial place in Ottomans' schemes of legitimacy. If anything, it became more important over time. Concomitantly, in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, sadat were incorporated into the ruling elite, askeri.
63 Meanwhile, Alid sympathies did not vanish, nor did the ties between shahs and Ottoman subjects.
Th e beginning of regular records coincided with the Ottoman-Safavid war of 1533-38. Th e two states were at war also in 1576-90, when Anatolia was shaken by intermittent Alid rebellions beside general Celali activity. 64 Simultaneously, the number of title deeds issued by the Imperial 60) Mélikoff 1998 : 48-49. Subrahmanyam 2003 idem 1997 : 751-55. Also, Fleischer 1992 Katz 1998, esp. 199-205. 61) See Faroqhi 1994: 144; MD 3: 410/909 (1559-60); MD 7: 3: 171/2316 MD 7: 3: 171/ , 179/2331 MD 7: 3: 171/ , 198/2371 MD 7: 3: 171/ , 195/2364 MD 7: 3: 171/ , 197/2368 MD 7: 3: 171/ (1568 Nakibüleşraf doubled. A sharper increase occurred later in the 1630s: Baghdad had been taken by the Safavids in 1624 and the two sides were again at war. Under those circumstances, it would appear, political exigency overlapped with religious commitment in shaping Ottoman policies regarding Muhammadan pedigree. Recognition of the claims of seyyidship would have served as a medium of patronage and cooption especially where love of 'the House' was likely to turn into an Alid political cause. Th ere is some evidence to that eff ect. First, trying to get leaders of the Kızılbaş tribes to change sides through off ers of grants and gifts was among the tactics of containment used by the Ottomans. 65 Secondly, several Alevi leaders today have in their family collections certifi cates of seyyidship issued in Istanbul, which deserves more attention than it has received so far. 66 In fact, the presence of a reference in the fi rst Nakibüleşraf Register to the seal of Tahmasb followed by a patently Alid couplet also suggests the circulation of documents between the two rival capitals. 67 In the same register, we see many Turcoman and pro-Safavid names, such as Turkish names compounded with 'Şah', suggesting that a good many Alid tribesmen may have been recognized as seyyid already in the 1530s, i.e. during the war against the Safavids. Also, the fact that a small group of Abbasids, i.e. descendants of the Prophet on paternal side, were identifi ed separately in the second register intimates that the rest were purportedly Talibids, i.e. Muhammad's and Ali's direct descendants.
68 Distinctions within the Muhammadan pedigree, including the 'seyyid-şerif ' distinction, later disappeared. To recapitulate then, these various pieces of evidence point to a possible convergence between the claims of Muhammadan nobility and its recognition. Namely, it seems likely that while actively persecuting the Kızılbaş, the Ottomans also tried to displace the Shah's authority by derailing the ties of loyalty that he had created between tribal leaders and himself. Th is would have amounted to the recognition of an Alid aristocracy (of dede lineages) in Anatolia.
69 Centralization and political realignment in Iran later in the seventeenth century, the symmetrical rise of Twelver orthodoxy in particular, would have helped the Ottoman policy of containment by weakening the messianic and revolutionary passion of the Anatolian Alids.
70 Recent studies on Ottoman Shiite communities during this period indicate that the attitude of the Ottoman center towards non-Sunnis was not hostile but varied between accommodation and ambiguity as long as the latter remained apolitical and made no public claims challenging the legitimacy of the Ottoman order.
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Having suggested possible Ottoman complicity in the spread of false claims of nobility, let us underline that this interpretation rests on a macro approach to the evidence at hand. Namely, about 30,000 seyyid entries from 1576-1695 involving 30 diff erent sub-governorships and districts have been used to obtain the maps presented here. Th is method denies a face to these 30,000 people. Th erefore, the interpretation off ered remains hypothetical until a detailed study of the registers, supported by other sources, especially about dede lineages, provides further evidence. Until naming patterns among sadat in eastern Balkans and Rumeli had a distinct bias for Ali, Hasan and Hüseyin as opposed to Muhammed, Mustafa, Ebu Bekir, Ömer and Osman. We still observe the same bias in modern Turkey in provinces known to have a large Alevi population. Yet, the sadat of Anatolia to the west of Sivas display an opposite tendency: the names of the Prophet of Islam and the fi rst three caliphs were more popular among them. While sadat in eastern Anatolia escaped the radar of the Nakibüleşraf Registers, sadat living in rural and smaller settlements in the province of Sivas preferred Alid names as opposed to sadat living in cities of the province, who did not. It is also noteworthy that among people who 'failed to prove' their pedigree in the late seventeenth-century inspections, Alid names were relatively more popular. In other words, the inspectors were possibly more scrupulous in examining Alid sympathizers. In brief, onomastic study of the material at hand proves to be suggestive but inconclusive by itself. For a detailed discussion, see Canbakal 2005: 258- such time, one could also speculate that the state indeed had a role in the apparent overlap between the geographical distribution of sadat and that of the Kızılbaş, but in a diff erent way, namely, by promoting alternative frames of loyalty and belief to address and coopt Alid sensibilities in regions where they remained high. Patronage of Halvetism as a most Alid Sunni order was one such strategy adopted by the Ottoman state. 72 Another one was the promotion of a new Bektaşism starting with Balım Sultan in 1501. Th is is probably more relevant for the question considered here because the Çelebi branch of Bektaşism claims descent from Balım Sultan and Hacı Bektaş, who is presented in his hagiography as seyyid. 73 Needless to say, none of these strategies of cooption, if this is indeed what the Registers of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf are telling us, are mutually exclusive.
b. Nomadism and Tribalism
State centralization and consolidation was a process that aff ected all subjects, if in diverse ways. Th e response too was diverse. Grievances of the transhumant tribes of the realm partly overlapped with those of the Kızılbaş of Anatolia, but Sunni tribes too had reasons to complain. Expansion of agriculture, loss of service-based privileges (due to the gradual elimination of the tribal militia in particular), marginalization of the tribal elites and forced settlement (iskan) are known to have contributed to the alienation of tribes in Anatolia and the Balkans.
74 Th e overlap between tribal territories and the distribution of seyyidship claims according to the Nakibüleşraf Registers suggests that challenges facing tribalism and transhumance were among the factors that propelled false claims in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Possibly, they continued to play such a role well until the nineteenth century.
Th e following fatwa by the chief mufti Abdullah Yenişehri (1718-30) encapsulates this situation:
72) See Clayer 1994. 73) Velayetname, which refers to Hacı Bektaş as seyyid, is dated to 1481-1501. Th is coincides with the emergence of the offi ce of the Imperial Nakibüleşraf. However, KarakayaStump cites an earlier text, Tabaqat by al-Wasiti (d.1343), which also recognizes Hacı Bektaş as seyyid. Karakaya-Stump 2008: 91-92, 96 One can identify four layers of insult in this instance. According to the off ender, 'Amr was not of noble blood but an impostor; he was a Turcoman, whose father had possibly just settled, and his family was poor since his father had to pay the farm tax at the lower rate deemed for landless peasants. Finally, the off ender belonged to the elite, the estate of tax-collectors, and 'Amr did not. Th is particular fatwa probably referred to the circumstances following the forced settlement of 1691, but it could well apply to earlier episodes of settlement too.
Tribes in Anatolia are known to have claimed seyyidship at various points during the period covered in this study. Some tribes did so when approached by tax collectors in the seventeenth century, as was the case also in Arab lands. 76 Th e exemption granted to sadat from the sheep tax (ağnam) no doubt constituted a special incentive for pastoralists to claim seyyidship. 77 Others claimed seyyidship in order to resist collective service obligations or forced settlement in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. 78 Th us, among the derbendci (guards of mountain passes) communities, for example, the clan of Kozanoğlu, later ayan of the northern Çukurova region, was one of those that resorted to seyyidship. In the inspection of 1658, a branch of the clan in Sis was found to hold forged certifi cates attributed to nakibüleşrafs Muhterem Efendi (1495 Efendi ( /96-1534 and Yahya Efendi (1585 -1586 . Th ey were thus "made reaya."
79 Th e derbendci system was heavily strained after the sixteenth century partly due to the violation of the derbenci communities' tax exemptions. 80 In other words, claims of Kozanoğlus and others like them are likely to have been driven by the urge to make up for these losses vis-à-vis increasing exactions of the imperial center.
Yet, claims of seyyidship among some tribesmen may haven been driven by more complicated factors than a refl ex against fi scal pressure. Th e Topuz clan (cemaat) is a case in point. Like Kozanoğlus, Topuzlar had branches reported in a vast area: in eastern Rumeli (Sığla, Vize, Dimetoka) as well as eastern Anatolia (Dersim/Tunceli). According to Türkay, they were Kurdish. At least the branch in Anatolia belonged to the Şeyh Hasanlı, one of the two large tribal groups in the region. 81 As this region was outside the reach of central control, Nakibüleşraf Registers do not say anything about claims of seyyidship among Topuz of eastern Anatolia. In the west, about 250 clan members in Şumnu and Dimetoka were identifi ed as true sadat by the inspectors in 1658. Th is was a remarkably high fi gure, comparable to the ashraf in contemporary Aleppo. 82 In addition, Topuzlar were characterized as a 'hearth' (ocak) and a lineage (sülale) in diff erent records, i.e. they were either descendants of a tribal militia hearth 83 or constituted a Kızılbaş hearth headed by a religious patriarch (dede), or both. Probably they were both, since tribal identity and Alid lineage continue to overlap in eastern Anatolia today. Gökbilgin 1957: 133, 143, 167. 83) For an example of claims of seyyidship among militia in Rumeli, see Hezarfen 2002: 135-36 . Th e case involves petitioners asking for a reduction in their tax assignment of 1699 arguing that they were descendants of the Prophet and of the "conquerors" (Evlad-ı Fatihan). Evlad-ı Fatihan was the name given to the militia of settled nomads in Rumeli which was a version of the old yaya-müsellem militia revived on the occasion of the OttomanHabsburg war. See, Gökbilgin 1957: 32, 42-48 Babayan's observations regarding the role played by Alid faith in the sixteenth century in creating blood ties and, eventually, tribes, point to the plasticity of tribal formations, and shed light on this overlap. 85 Likewise, Andrews's work on some Alevi groups in modern Turkey and Nakash's work on Iraqi tribes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries highlight the role of the sadat in providing a tribal genealogy that generated unity and strength. In an episode of structural transformation in particular, Nakash argues, sadat could provide a new locus of authority in support of the tribal chiefs and alleviate the eff ects of tribal breakdown. 86 It is clear that in order to disentangle the chicken-and-egg equation intimated by Babayan regarding the sixteenth century, two lines of research need to be combined: research on Alids of diff erent leanings in the Ottoman realm and research on the structural impact of migration, settlement and sedentarization on tribal subjects of the empire throughout Ottoman history. Here again, close study of the Nakibüleşraf Registers may prove very useful.
(Towards a) Conclusion
Most of what we know about seyyidization rests on studies on the Arab provinces of the empire, particularly Syria and Egypt in the eighteenth century, although it is known since Barkan, 87 at least, that false claims of seyyidship were not uncommon in Anatolia and the Balkans either. Th is asymmetry of information about sadat in diff erent parts of the empire refl ects a broader chasm among national/regional historiographies of the post-Ottoman world, manifested as it is, in their treatment of centerperiphery relations in particular. For example, early scholarship on Arab ashraf saw in seyyidization the cultivation of a cultural and political identity against Ottomans/Turks: a good thing. In various versions of this view, usurpation of the title 'sharif ' tied in neatly with the history of decline in Turkey as a young man in the 1930s. He has no memory of seyyidship or Alevism in the family, but remembers his uncle being a Bektaşi. I am grateful to Mr. Topuzoğlu for giving me his time and sharing his memories. On the sadat of Şumnu, see also Evliya Çelebi 1996: 3: 178-179. 85) Babayan 2002: 353-54. 86) Andrews 1989: 117, 124-25; Bumke 1989: 512-514; Nakash 1994: 37-39 direct central control, especially in the eighteenth century. By the same token, it also correlated with the rise of provincial elites many of whom 'turned out' to be ashraf, i.e. members of the largest and most important noble house recognized by the Ottomans. On the other side of the historiographic divide, passing remarks on seyyidization in the literature on central lands of the empire saw the phenomenon precisely as representatives of the Ottoman ruling establishment saw it, i.e. as violation of the social and political order, primarily for purposes of tax evasion: a bad thing.
88 Th is view too placed title usurpation squarely in the context of decline in imperial control or outright 'decline'.
Reassessment of the period in Ottoman history previously characterized as 'decline', i.e. the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has partly remedied this historiographic polarity in the past two decades. Yet, new approaches to center-periphery relations have not yet produced a composite understanding of seyyidization which was a multifaceted phenomenon whose driving force varied across time and space. Th e circumstances that engendered Alid claims of seyyidship in sixteenth-century Anatolia were very diff erent from, for example, those in eighteenth-century Damascus or Cairo. Similarly, the identity of the claimants was diff erent. Th is study indicates that seyyidization started in Anatolia and the Balkans in the sixteenth century, a time presumed to be the height of Ottoman power, and continued in the seventeenth century, a period characterized, fi rst, by provincial centralization, then by the Köprülü restoration.
Creation of the offi ce of imperial nakibüleşraf around the turn of the sixteenth century and the attempt to introduce central registration evoke domestic Alid dissent and rival legitimacy claims of the Safavids as a possible factor that shaped Ottoman policies towards sadat. 89 If Alid leaders began to claim seyyidship around this time, as promoted by the shah, Ottomans' move to monitor claims of seyyidship, whether to protect the purity of the noble line or to make a bid comparable to that of the shah to honor the House, would appear politically sensible. Nevertheless, by examining the Nakibüleşraf Registers alone, especially using the macro approach followed in this study, it cannot be determined whether the Ottoman center indeed manipulated the title deliberately in order to attract Alid loyalties; nor can one say if the sadat we see in the sixteenthand seventeenth-century registers were Kızılbaş leaders or other state-spon-88) Compare, for instance, Bodman (1963) and Barkan (1966) . 89) For a similar interpretation, see Salati 1992: 22-23. sored Alids, such as the Çelebi branch of the Bektaşis or another order like the Halvetis.
Geographical distribution of the certifi cates issued by the imperial nakibüleşraf also suggests a connection between seyyidization and tribes and transhumance. Despite the possibility of an overlap between Alid and tribal identities in this zone, claims of nobility among tribes need not be attributed to a religious drive alone. Gradual marginalization of the tribes in the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries in the Ottoman political space was an aspect of fi scal and administrative centralization, against which claims of seyyidship may have been hoped to provide a degree of economic protection and political leverage. Th e association between claims of seyyidship and the fi scal privileges it provided was recognized by the Ottoman elite as early as the sixteenth century, 90 and undoubtedly this was a prominent factor that propelled seyyidization among other social groups as well. As for its political role, that rested on the title's exceptional source of legitimacy: namely, the House of Muhammad provided a counter claim of nobility. Th erefore, it potentially represented a stance and power independent of the Ottoman center, if not against it, and independent of those associated with the center. By the same token, one could surmise that the settlement of the 'servants of the sultan' (kul) in the provinces from the early seventeenth century onwards also contributed to the spread of seyyidization among various social groups, particularly the elites, since this administrative change upset the local power relations. Th is and other alternative dynamics of seyyidization have to be subject of another study comparing Anatolian and Arab provinces.
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